In Jtg1's conceptual analysis on "character," he defines and explains the word as "moral excellence and firmness." For someone to have character means that person will do what is good or virtuous, and will not deter from this. He also explains the apparent discrepancy in definitions of "character" from culture to culture because cultures tend to define morality - whether by this, they mean what is good or evil, or what is virtue and what is vice - in different ways. By understanding what is meant by "character," he says others will be able to understand whether or not to trust someone, who is said to lack character, with something important. Yet within his analysis there exists both room for contradiction and room for absurdity.
For example, suppose Calypso and Didymus are students at a famous college. The two of them must work on a group assignment, which is an important part of their grade. The two of them have a choice of either dividing the work between them, with each taking one part, or working jointly on the entire assignment. The latter choice will take more time, which is undesirable, but the former choice requires the two to trust each other to fulfill their part of the work. According to Jtg1’s analysis, Calypso will know whether or not she can trust Didymus to do his part of the assignment by understanding what “character” is, and whether or not Didymus has it or not.
If Calypso and Didymus both were members of the same culture, with the same sense of morality – goods and evils, or virtues and vices – then there would be no problem with this analysis. Here is where contradiction arises: Calypso and Didymus are students at a famous college. The college environment is well known for being a multi-cultural environment, with those in charge of college admissions purposefully selecting students from a wide range of cultures and ethnicities. In all likelihood, with the great number of overlapping cultures within the college environment, Calypso and Didymus are probably members of different cultures.
Being of different cultures means that they will have different ideas of what the goods and evils or the virtues and vices are. For example, suppose that in Calypso’s culture, it is a virtue to take things easy in life. For people to have character in Calypso’s culture means, among other things, that they in turn will “take things easy,” that is, they will not work as hard or as strenuously as they might be able to, but rather stay calm and relaxed throughout.
In contrast, suppose that in Didymus’ culture, it is a virtue to work to the very best of his ability. For people to have character in Didymus’ culture means that they will work to the very best of their ability, that is, they will work as hard or as strenuously as they might be able to, likely becoming stressed in the process. Each of these two concepts has its benefits and downfalls. The only difference is which one their culture has established as virtue and which one was not.
Yet these two concepts of virtue are mutually exclusive. One cannot simultaneously “take things easy” – to not work as hard or as strenuously as one might be able to, but rather stay calm and relaxed throughout – and work to the best of one’s ability – to work as hard or as strenuously as one might be able to, likely becoming stressed in the process. Because one cannot display “moral excellence” while failing to meet one of the standards of morality in the first place, Didymus and Calypso cannot fail to meet their respective virtue. Thus, for Didymus or Calypso to have character in one of their cultures is to not have character in the other culture.
If Didymus asked members of his cultural community if Calypso had character, they would likely judge her by their own standards. In which case, if she holds to her own community’s standards of morality, they would tell Didymus that she lacks character. Yet if Didymus then asked members of Calypso’s cultural community instead, they would judge her by their own standards. In which case, because she holds to her own community’s standards of morality, they would indeed tell Didymus that she does have character.
This is a contradiction. Calypso is simultaneously being said to both possess character, and to lack character. One cannot have both A and not A at the same time. Both cultures are within their bounds to make this statement about her. It is not a mistake for them to say either thing. Yet there must be some mistake for this contradiction to arise in the first place. Either the idea of character or Jtg1’s analysis of character must be wrong, if it can lead to contradiction like this.
Where contradiction leads to absurdity comes through a process called enculturation. Enculturation is when a person, being thoroughly exposed and engrained in another culture, picks up the cultural norms and habits of that culture. This process usually, but not always, results in the loss of attachment to the person’s original culture, and the cultural norms and habits associated with it. In short, enculturation is when one person becomes part of another culture, and that culture supplants their original one.
For example, suppose that after spending time with Didymus, Calypso decides to join his culture. The simplest way this would happen is if Calypso and Didymus started a relationship, and while being exposed to his family, friends and culture, became fully enculturated. Among other things, this would include the virtues that his culture holds to be true, including the virtue of working to the very best of one’s ability.
Soon enough, as Calypso takes on more and more traits of Didymus’ culture, the people of Didymus’ culture will begin to say that she now has character. This is because, as previously mentioned, they will judge her on the basis of their own cultural standards. Yet there is a problem here. By becoming enculturated in Didymus’ culture, Calypso would have had to give up the virtues her own culture followed, such as the virtue of taking things easy.
This would put her at odds with her original culture, which would also judge her on the basis of their own cultural standards. As previously mentioned, these two virtues – takings things easy, or working to the very best of one’s ability – are mutually exclusive. For Calypso to have character in Didymus’ culture now is to not have character in her original culture anymore. Instead of going from “A and not A” to “A and A,” Calypso only managed to reverse her initial position to “not A and A.”
Indeed, because of the mutual exclusivity generated by these divergent virtues, there is no possible way for Calypso to have character in both cultures. She will always be said to both to have and not have character. Indeed, even if Didymus’ culture did not exist, there would still be others like it due to the cultural overlap that exists on a planetary level. It is utterly impossible for Calypso to fully have character, because there will always be a cultural group, if not multiple cultural groups, that have an opposing conception of what cultural norms make up the goods and evils or virtues and vices that comprise the moral excellence innate to character. This is absurd.
Without a universal understanding of what are the goods and evils or the virtues and vices, there is no universal understanding of what moral excellence is. Without a universal understanding of what moral excellence is, there is no universal understanding of what makes up character. Without a universal understanding of what makes up character, people will disagree on what makes up character, leading to these situations where people can simultaneously be said to have character and to not have character.
Jtg1 says that by understanding character as “moral excellence and firmness,” one would be able to know whether to trust someone who is said to lack character. Yet lacking character is not only a matter of cultural perspective, it is arguable that everyone could be said to lack character if one only looked at them from the right – or rather, the wrong – perspective. Not only that, but there is no way for a person to satisfy every culture’s expectations of what constitutes character, which traps them in an unending “have character and not have character” spiral paradox. For these reasons, character alone should never be the basis of trust, unless a person is working in a single culture environment. In this time frame, that is exceedingly rare to find. Character is a linguistic concept that, without a universal definition of morality, only leads to contradiction in an increasingly multicultural world.
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