Badhwar, Neera K. "The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits." Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review, 13(2-3), 257-289. 33 p. 2009.
This long article focuses on the Milgram Experiments and the like: experiments showing just how easily affected character is by situational factors. It is divided into several sections; chief among them being his revision of Aristotle’s conception of virtue as not being global, that global virtue is “psychologically impossible.” He also puts forth his conception of domain-specific character traits, but this is less important to my paper.
Currie, Gregory. "Narrative and the Psychology of Character." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67(1), 61-71. 11 p. Winter 2009.
This article focuses on character, in regards to how it is used by writers for fictional characters. In particular, it focuses on how fictional characters are shown to use character as a tool of inference. This is representative of how people operate in the real world, using character as a tool for judgement. Yet the author uses evidence of situationism to criticize character-based fiction. While he does not make any full statements of opinion, he does suggest that, among other things, it is possible such character-based fiction is “propaganda in support of a dangerously mistaken morality.”
Harman, Gilbert. "Skepticism about Character Traits." Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review, 13(2-3), 235-242. 8 p. 2009.
This article is important to my paper, not in its own worth as an article, but as what it provides. The article itself is rather short, but it provides both a condense look on the subject - skepticism about character traits - as well as information from a wide selection of other writers on the subject. He uses the work of all these other writers to support his own points. He focuses especially on social and personality psychology, until finally trying to make a distinction between a “folk conception” of virtue and “what is actually true.”
Kamtekar, Rachana. "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character." Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 114(3), 458-491. 34 p. April 2004.
This article talks about how Situationism began to develop, and how it chiefly questions the existence of character. Yet the article largely focuses on making a distinction between the “character” that Situationism calls into question and the “character” that Virtue Ethics actually supports. It makes the distinction between testing dispositions and how character should be inclusive of reason, not of simple reaction.
Merritt, Maria. "Aristotelean Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character." Journal of Moral Philosophy: An International Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, 6(1), 23-49. 27 p. 2009.
This article focuses strongly on Aristotelean virtue theory, beginning with an examination of the subject. It then applies it to actual psychology and the results of psychological experiments. She very clearly states that the issue she has is distinct from situationism though. She focuses instead on how interpersonal relationships, usually used to reinforce character virtues, can also lead to disruptions in character when the mistakes of one impact another through said relationship.
Upton, Candace L. "A Contextual Account of Character Traits." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 122(2), 133-151. 19 p. January 2005.
One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article focuses on the nature of character traits. The article explicitly questions the stability of character traits, and brings up traits that are thought to be entirely context-sensitive, such as honesty. She thereafter spends many pages in defense of her view, before enlarging it to explain how all character traits should be similarly regarded in context-sensitive understanding.
Upton, Candace L. "Context, Character, and Consequentialist Friendships." Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 20(3), 334-347. 14 p. September 2008.
One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article largely functions as a response to a counterexample. That counterexample was that consequentialism cannot believe in genuine friendships. Though she is aware that other counter-counterexamples exist, she claims the one she explains is a more sophisticated one. Yet more important than this is, after making this claim, she goes on to write about “genuine friendship” being a context-sensitive character trait, and not an aspect of friendship consequentialism cannot maintain because of neutrality.
Upton, Candace L. "Virtue Ethics, Character, and Normative Receptivity." Journal of Moral Philosophy: An International Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, 5(1), 77-95. 19 p. 2008.
One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article focuses on character traits and primarily two divergent views. The first she works with is a “classical” view of character as causing action and being global. The second she works with is an “extra-classical view.” This second view is meant to take into account subtle aspects of human nature. In some ways, this article reads as an expansion on "A Contextual Account of Character Traits."
Webber, Jonathan. "Character, Consistency, and Classification." Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, 115(459), 651-658. 8 p. July 2006.
One of two articles I’m working with by this author, this article is largely a counterexample to another counterexample. In this case, it focuses on the work of John Doris’ Lack of Character and the criticism made by Gopal Sreenivasan, namely, that Doris’ claim that virtue ethics is wrong, is unsupported. Yet this author highlights the fact that the two are working with two distinct definitions of the same phrase (“cross-situational consistency”) and that because their definitions are different, Sreenivasan fails to disprove Doris. He does question Doris late in the article, but this distinction of definitions remains an important factor, whether or not Doris could be wrong in some other way.
Webber, Jonathan. "Character, Global and Local." Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 19(4), 430-434. 5 p. December 2007.
One of two articles I’m working with by this author, this article is an interesting contrast. While the previous article defended Doris in some ways, this article seeks to counter Doris on the basis of importance while also positing his own belief that this debate is pointless. He talks about virtue ethics as a tool that requires a theory of character for people to become more moral. Even if character is in question, it is the theory that is important for ethical advancement rather than situation management. This is an important article, despite the fact that it is so short.
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