Do human beings have a true self? Before we can answer this question, we must also ask, what is a “true self”? Many people instinctively believe they have one – saying such things as ‘the true self is how one really is’ – but actually explaining what it is, or why they believe they have it, is a more difficult task. For the sake of this analysis, I shall assume two main points as true: first, that all human beings do have a true self, and that the true self is functionally defined as being moral, stable and unchanging. I assume these things, because while trying to answer the question, “Do human beings have a true self?” I have no way to physically test the presence of the true self within human beings. I can only rely on a logical examination of the fundamental attributes of the true self to ascertain the validity of these claims.
If we take the true self to be moral, however, than one has the issue with understanding what “moral” is as well. Here there is the first of several issues that arises from this definition of the true self: people do not intrinsically know what is “moral.” There is no circuit board in the mind, a clear yes-no answer automatically generated in all situations that allows a human being to instinctively and readily infer a morally right action from a morally wrong action. To determine what is moral requires judgement, active use of the mind’s faculties, and judgement is subject to individual perspective. Perspectives, however, can and do tend to conflict.
Thus what is moral is the subject of constant debate, and has been for millennia, if not since the dawn of rational human thought, and the current human populace is no closer to ending the debate than it has ever been before. Since people cannot decide what moral is or is not, then moral must be left as an unknown in the equation. One cannot define something otherwise unknown with another unknown in the hopes of proving the existence of the first. As an unknown, the truth could just as easily undermine, instead of support, the definition. What is moral must then be disregarded from the assumptions on that ground.
Some may consider a conscience, as an emotional response to an event or line of thought, to be an indication of the true self’s moral guidance, but then what of the psychopath who knows nothing of guilt? Is one to presume that the psychopath’s true self is somehow deficient? A deficient true self can hardly qualify as a true self, for by its very nature, one’s true self cannot be deficient. Deficiency implies that something has been taken away or is lacking, but the true self is said – and assumed here – to be stable and unchanging. You cannot take away from something that is stable and unchanging, and for something to be lacking implies that it can lose or grow in the first place – actions that also cannot be true because of the basic assumptions. The only way to disqualify the psychopath from the assumptions is to say that the psychopath is not a human being. Since psychopaths are indeed human beings, then what is moral must be disregarded from the equation on that ground as well.
The true self is also said to be stable, a solid foundation for a person’s character. Yet the problem with this is that there is a lack of empirical evidence to suggest that a person’s character has any stability. Indeed, studies over the last century record evidence quite contrary to this idea. There is a laundry list of factors, even insubstantial ones, that have shown to have a profound effect on human behavior: personal mood (Isen and Levin experiment, 1972), haste (Darley and Batson experiment, 1973), cultural inclinations, perspective, the presence or absence of peers (Latane and Darley experiments, 1970) or superiors (Milgram experiments, 1974), etc. Humans are capable of great atrocity, or surprising kindness, even with a shift of small variables. Yet in regards to the assumptions at hand, it does not even matter what those factors are. What does matter is the sheer fact that one realizes the lack of evidence for stability.
If there is little to no evidence for stability in a person’s character, then it is likely – although not assuredly – that stability does not exist. Because this is an argument attempting to prove the existence of the true self, one must veer away from blind faith in the stability of character and instead take it for what it most likely is: an arbitrary linguistic attribution. No matter the authority assigning them, one cannot put stock in arbitrary attributions without an appropriate level of evidence, and then accept those attributions as evidence for something else. In other words, “stable” as a quality of the true self is not stable enough to depend on. If one cannot depend on it, then it has no force and cannot be used for anything.
Indeed, even without the empirical evidence displaying the lack of stability, one can still see this lack of stability in normal human life. Rather, it is self-evident that the events a person experiences, whether singular and drastic, or frequent and minimal, can affect a lasting change on that person. In the former case, it is obvious how traumatic events can cause harm, sometimes irreparably, to a person’s character. For example, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is unfortunately a common and highly visible issue, especially in wartime and in victims of violent crime, that can display stark contrasts in the effected person’s initial behavior and their later behavior. This, however, is an extreme case, and something as simple as bullying or the death of a family member can also cause behavioral shifts in an individual.
In the latter case, it can be summed up in a single word: habituation. By doing something over and over again, a person can make that thing a habit, eventually reaching a point where repeating said activity can be done without even needing to be fully conscious of it. Yet a habit, though long lasting and hard to break, can also be unmade, through an opposing process of not doing that thing which contributed to the formation of the habit in the first place, and possibly through forming another habit instead. The person who has a started a habit of biting their nails when stressed has several ways in which said habit can be broken, and thus become a reformed nail biter.
Indeed, rather than displaying the stability of character that is expected of the true self, it is much clearer to see how human beings display an adaptability of character. This goes hand in hand with the earlier argument against the true self’s moral qualities. If people did not possess this ability to adapt, to learn and grow from their experiences, then there would also be no concept of moral growth and its opposite, moral stagnation, and trying to teach children anything of morality would just be a waste of time. Children do need to be taught, however, in the same way that a parent or guardian must teach them so many other things. Does this lack of innate morality mean that children do not have a true self? Yet children are human beings, and if we take human beings as having a true self, then that can only be true if children are not considered human beings.
That, then, is the central issue. If one believes that all human beings have a true self, and that the true self is moral, stable and unchanging, then one must either exclude some people, like psychopaths and children, from being considered “human beings,” or drop the defining attributes of “moral, stable and unchanging” from its description. Yet historically, if one excludes the title of “human being” from such people, then those who are still considered human beings may use that as a justification for treating them inhumanely, as has been done in the past, and as such, I am unwilling to make that concession. However, if one takes away those key attributes, then there is little else to define a true self by, and without a proper definition, the “true self” becomes a meaningless concept that would be better to disavow then accept on faith as so many already do.
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