There are several points on which one could counter the reasons for dismissing the true self as outlined in the preceding conceptual analysis. If one argued against one the fundamental assumptions of the last paper, than many of the subsequent propositions fall through. First off, and possibly most important, is the assumption that all human beings possess a true self. Part of the argument for the dismissal of the attributes “moral” and “stable” - that is, the apparent lack of them in people, especially people who are children or psychopaths - both hinge on this fact.
Instead of making it a matter of “human” or “not human,” both cases could be rationalized in another way. Children do not necessarily have to be declared not human, but still developing human beings. Thus a human being can still have a true self, but a child as a developing human being is still developing towards their true self. Psychopaths do not have to be declared not human, but human beings with a certain mental deficiency. In the same way that vision is still an aspect of a human being, but there are those who are blind, one could argue that the conscience is still an aspect of a human being, even if they cannot feel it.
There are also ways to defend “moral” and “stable” as attributes in their own right. The analysis takes moral issues as a sign of a lack of centralized morality, but there are some issues on which people do agree. Instead of considering morality as black and white, one could argue instead for black-gray-white morality. The analysis also takes a lack of evidentiary stability as proof for the entire lack thereof. To answer that claim, put forward evidence for stability of character and the argument falls through. In short, because the analysis relies on strict definitions and rigidity, arguing instead for flexibility and diversity would undermine whatever force it might possess.
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