Major Paper

This is a triple redundancy: hard copy, email, and this post.

The Necessity of Character Reassessment

Scratch that, I'll put it up here if I need to but I don't want anyone to steal this.

Dialectic

Character is a very important trait. Functionally, character is used in language to assess a person in some way, especially to make decisions or judgments. For example, if someone is said to be lacking in character, then by understanding what character is, one will know it is unsafe to trust that person with something important. Yet the word “character” has several definitions and is sometimes used in a general way in the vernacular. In this paper, I will look at what it means to have character, why character as such cannot exist, and how it still remains an important linguistic concept.

What is meant by the word, “character?” Fundamentally, there are two definitions for “character.” The first definition is “the attributes or features that make up or distinguish an individual.” This definition for character makes it a very general, almost universal term that could be applied to anything that could qualify as an attribute. However, this definition is more synonymous with “character traits” than the definition that will be employed in this paper.

The definition of “character” that is used here instead is “moral excellence and firmness.” Rather than the previous definition’s generality of traits, this definition is specific. It refers to only a pair of traits, yet each of these traits is equally important. Because character is comprised of both of these traits, to understand character one must look at both of these traits in turn.

“Moral excellence” is a phrase – a pair of words that constitute their own unique definition to be understood in conjunction – comprised of two words: “moral” and “excellence.” “Excellence” is a word whose definition is easily understood: excellence merely refers to the quality of being of the highest level possible. Here in this phrase, however, the former word – “moral” – is applied to the latter – “excellence” – to refer to a specific kind of excellence.

This specific kind of excellence is “moral.” Yet what is “moral”? For something to be moral, it must first subscribe to a system of morality. Morality is a system of two contrasting elements: either goods and evils, or virtues and vices. What is “moral” is thus what the goods or the virtues are, and in contrast, what is “immoral,” that is, not moral, is what the evils or vices are. When the phrase is applied to a person, that is, when a person is said to be moral, it means they follow the goods or the virtues.

The second trait that defines “character” is “firmness.” Unlike “moral excellence,” it is a stand alone word and thus easier to understand. Firmness is defined as having two aspects: a positive aspect, and a negative aspect. The positive aspect says what “firmness” is: it is securely and solidly fixed in place, that is, it is stable. The negative aspect says what “firmness” is not: it is not subject to change or revision, that is, it is unchanging.

Now that the two traits of character have been defined, they can be fit together so as to be understood. Thus, when the phrase, “moral excellence” is taken as a whole, with each component fitting with the next, it can be taken to mean “the quality of following the goods or the virtues to the highest level.” When “firmness” is then added to “moral excellence” it becomes “the stable and unchanging quality of following the goods or the virtues to the highest level.”

The presence or absence of character is not something that can be scientifically proven. There is no “character” gene in the human genetic code. There is no “character” gland that produces this effect in the nervous system, and no “character” lobe that is responsible for it within the mind. The only way to know whether a person has character or not is entirely dependent upon whether the person is said to have character or not. To be said to have character or not requires another person’s judgment.

Yet there is a problem with this definition. What is moral – that is, what are the goods or the virtues – is not universally agreed upon. What is good or virtuous in one culture may not be good or virtuous in another culture, or worse, may in fact be evil or a vice. When a person makes a judgment, that person bases their judgment on his or her own cultural values, that is, on what his or her culture agrees upon what the goods or the virtues are.

This would not pose a problem to this definition of character if one lived in a single culture environment, but with the modern level of movement and communication, the existence of the single culture environment is in the minority and slowly diminishing. Instead, multicultural environments are the status quo, leading to a problem of perspectives. Because this is a complicated problem to explain, an example will be used to illustrate.

Suppose that Eurydice and Frederick are students at a famous college. The college environment is widely known as a multicultural environment, as colleges frequently seek students from many different places and cultures. Eurydice and Frederick are members of different cultures, with each culture having its own cultural values. Other members of their respective cultures are also students at this college, representing their respective cultures on the campus.

Suppose that in Eurydice’s culture it is a virtue to work as hard as possible. By the nature of this virtue, fulfilling this virtue causes stress on the one fulfilling it. In contrast, suppose that in Frederick’s culture it is a virtue to take things easy. This means that, even when working, the one fulfilling this virtue should remain calm and unstressed.

Though each of these two virtues has their own merits, these two virtues are also mutually exclusive. A person could manifest one or the other, but fulfilling one virtue excludes the possibility of fulfilling the other virtue. It is impossible to manifest both at the same time. Yet for a person to be said to have character, that person must show “moral excellence and firmness.”

Thus, the only way for a person to be said to have character in one of these cultures is if they fully exhibit one of the two virtues. A person could manifest one of these virtues at one time and the other at another time, but this would not fulfill the “firmness” trait associated with character. A person cannot be said to be “stable and unchanging” if that person is constantly swinging back and forth between two exclusionary virtues.

If a person tried to fulfill both traits simultaneously, that person would only be able to manifest the virtues partially and never in full. Fulfilling the virtues only in part would not fulfill the “moral excellence” trait associated with character, for something cannot be considered “of the highest level possible” if it is only exhibited it in part. “In part” implies that there is a level beyond it, that is, a level of fullness, completeness.

            If we suppose that Eurydice is said to have character in her culture, then she must work as hard as she can at college. Yet this college is a multicultural environment, of which Frederick’s culture is also a part. Because these two virtues are mutually exclusive, if someone in Frederick’s culture was asked if Eurydice had character, they would say she did not. Thus, at the same time, Eurydice is both being said to have character and said to not have character.

            This is a contradiction: a person cannot both have and not have something. A person cannot both have and not have character. Yet there is no way to scientifically prove that “character” exists. To know if a person has character or not is entirely dependant on the judgment of other people. In a multicultural environment like the one just mentioned, there are frequently situations like this where people from different cultures have different understandings of what is moral, and thus what goods or virtues constitute character.

            If there is no way to scientifically prove that character exists, and the only means of determining character philosophically leads to contradiction, then there is no proof that character actually exists at all. But if it does not actually exist, than why does this definition of character – “the stable and unchanging quality of following the goods or the virtues to the highest level” – still exist? In all likelihood, this definition of character exists for the same reason that the definition of “perfection” exists.

            “Perfection” being defined as “free from flaw or defect,” it is widely understood that “perfection” does not actually exist in the world. Nothing is entirely flawless or without defect, and yet this concept exists. It serves as a standard that people can strive for in anything they do. People try to get as close to perfection as they can, leading them to increasingly greater or better works.

            Character can be taken the same way. People try to follow the goods or the virtues to the highest level, striving for this moral standard. Even if they cannot achieve it entirely – and in all likelihood, they cannot – “character” is still of intrinsic worth as the standard to which people try to achieve, in the same way that people try to achieve perfection. Rather than a trait that people actually possess, “character” seems more like a concept that others apply to a person who most exhibits this standard from their cultural perspective. Put another way, “character” is a conceptual label for believed moral greatness.

Annotated Bibliography

Badhwar, Neera K. "The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits." Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review, 13(2-3), 257-289. 33 p. 2009.

            This long article focuses on the Milgram Experiments and the like: experiments showing just how easily affected character is by situational factors. It is divided into several sections; chief among them being his revision of Aristotle’s conception of virtue as not being global, that global virtue is “psychologically impossible.” He also puts forth his conception of domain-specific character traits, but this is less important to my paper.

Currie, Gregory. "Narrative and the Psychology of Character." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67(1), 61-71. 11 p. Winter 2009.

            This article focuses on character, in regards to how it is used by writers for fictional characters. In particular, it focuses on how fictional characters are shown to use character as a tool of inference. This is representative of how people operate in the real world, using character as a tool for judgement. Yet the author uses evidence of situationism to criticize character-based fiction. While he does not make any full statements of opinion, he does suggest that, among other things, it is possible such character-based fiction is “propaganda in support of a dangerously mistaken morality.”

Harman, Gilbert. "Skepticism about Character Traits." Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review, 13(2-3), 235-242. 8 p. 2009.

            This article is important to my paper, not in its own worth as an article, but as what it provides. The article itself is rather short, but it provides both a condense look on the subject - skepticism about character traits - as well as information from a wide selection of other writers on the subject. He uses the work of all these other writers to support his own points. He focuses especially on social and personality psychology, until finally trying to make a distinction between a “folk conception” of virtue and “what is actually true.”

Kamtekar, Rachana. "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character." Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 114(3), 458-491. 34 p. April 2004.

            This article talks about how Situationism began to develop, and how it chiefly questions the existence of character. Yet the article largely focuses on making a distinction between the “character” that Situationism calls into question and the “character” that Virtue Ethics actually supports. It makes the distinction between testing dispositions and how character should be inclusive of reason, not of simple reaction.

Merritt, Maria. "Aristotelean Virtue and the Interpersonal Aspect of Ethical Character." Journal of Moral Philosophy: An International Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, 6(1), 23-49. 27 p. 2009.

            This article focuses strongly on Aristotelean virtue theory, beginning with an examination of the subject. It then applies it to actual psychology and the results of psychological experiments. She very clearly states that the issue she has is distinct from situationism though. She focuses instead on how interpersonal relationships, usually used to reinforce character virtues, can also lead to disruptions in character when the mistakes of one impact another through said relationship.

Upton, Candace L. "A Contextual Account of Character Traits." Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 122(2), 133-151. 19 p. January 2005.

            One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article focuses on the nature of character traits. The article explicitly questions the stability of character traits, and brings up traits that are thought to be entirely context-sensitive, such as honesty. She thereafter spends many pages in defense of her view, before enlarging it to explain how all character traits should be similarly regarded in context-sensitive understanding.

Upton, Candace L. "Context, Character, and Consequentialist Friendships." Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 20(3), 334-347. 14 p. September 2008.

            One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article largely functions as a response to a counterexample. That counterexample was that consequentialism cannot believe in genuine friendships. Though she is aware that other counter-counterexamples exist, she claims the one she explains is a more sophisticated one. Yet more important than this is, after making this claim, she goes on to write about “genuine friendship” being a context-sensitive character trait, and not an aspect of friendship consequentialism cannot maintain because of neutrality.

Upton, Candace L. "Virtue Ethics, Character, and Normative Receptivity." Journal of Moral Philosophy: An International Journal of Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, 5(1), 77-95. 19 p. 2008.

            One of three articles I’m working with by this author, this article focuses on character traits and primarily two divergent views. The first she works with is a “classical” view of character as causing action and being global. The second she works with is an “extra-classical view.” This second view is meant to take into account subtle aspects of human nature. In some ways, this article reads as an expansion on "A Contextual Account of Character Traits."

Webber, Jonathan. "Character, Consistency, and Classification." Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, 115(459), 651-658. 8 p. July 2006.

            One of two articles I’m working with by this author, this article is largely a counterexample to another counterexample. In this case, it focuses on the work of John Doris’ Lack of Character and the criticism made by Gopal Sreenivasan, namely, that Doris’ claim that virtue ethics is wrong, is unsupported. Yet this author highlights the fact that the two are working with two distinct definitions of the same phrase (“cross-situational consistency”) and that because their definitions are different, Sreenivasan fails to disprove Doris. He does question Doris late in the article, but this distinction of definitions remains an important factor, whether or not Doris could be wrong in some other way.

Webber, Jonathan. "Character, Global and Local." Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies, 19(4), 430-434. 5 p. December 2007.

            One of two articles I’m working with by this author, this article is an interesting contrast. While the previous article defended Doris in some ways, this article seeks to counter Doris on the basis of importance while also positing his own belief that this debate is pointless. He talks about virtue ethics as a tool that requires a theory of character for people to become more moral. Even if character is in question, it is the theory that is important for ethical advancement rather than situation management. This is an important article, despite the fact that it is so short.