Conceptual Analysis Counterexamples

There are several points on which one could counter the reasons for dismissing the true self as outlined in the preceding conceptual analysis. If one argued against one the fundamental assumptions of the last paper, than many of the subsequent propositions fall through. First off, and possibly most important, is the assumption that all human beings possess a true self. Part of the argument for the dismissal of the attributes “moral” and “stable” - that is, the apparent lack of them in people, especially people who are children or psychopaths - both hinge on this fact.

Instead of making it a matter of “human” or “not human,” both cases could be rationalized in another way. Children do not necessarily have to be declared not human, but still developing human beings. Thus a human being can still have a true self, but a child as a developing human being is still developing towards their true self. Psychopaths do not have to be declared not human, but human beings with a certain mental deficiency. In the same way that vision is still an aspect of a human being, but there are those who are blind, one could argue that the conscience is still an aspect of a human being, even if they cannot feel it.

There are also ways to defend “moral” and “stable” as attributes in their own right. The analysis takes moral issues as a sign of a lack of centralized morality, but there are some issues on which people do agree. Instead of considering morality as black and white, one could argue instead for black-gray-white morality. The analysis also takes a lack of evidentiary stability as proof for the entire lack thereof. To answer that claim, put forward evidence for stability of character and the argument falls through. In short, because the analysis relies on strict definitions and rigidity, arguing instead for flexibility and diversity would undermine whatever force it might possess. 

Conceptual Analysis: The True Self

            Do human beings have a true self? Before we can answer this question, we must also ask, what is a “true self”? Many people instinctively believe they have one, but actually explaining what it is, or why they believe they have it, is a more difficult task. For the sake of this argument, one shall consider that human beings do have a true self, and that the true self is the idealized self, being moral, stable and unchanging.

            If we take the true self to be moral, however, than one has the issue with understanding what “moral” is as well. Here there is the first of several issues that arises from this definition of the true self: people do not intrinsically know what is “moral.” There is no circuit board in the mind that allows a human being to instinctively and readily infer a morally right action from a morally wrong action. To determine what is moral requires judgement, and judgement is subject to individual perspective. Perspectives, however, can tend to conflict.

Thus what is moral is the subject of constant debate, and has been for millennia, if not since the dawn of rational human thought, and the current human populace is no closer to ending the debate than it has ever been before. Since people cannot decide what moral is or is not, then moral must be left as an unknown in the equation. One cannot define something otherwise unknown with another unknown in the hopes of proving the existence of the first. As an unknown, the truth could just as easily undermine, instead of support, the definition. What is moral must then be disregarded from the equation on that ground.

            Some may consider a conscience, as an emotional response to an event or line of thought, to be an indication of the true self’s moral guidance, but then what of the psychopath who knows nothing of guilt? Is one to presume that the psychopath’s true self is somehow deficient? A deficient true self can hardly qualify as a true self, for by its very nature, one’s true self cannot be deficient. The only way to disqualify the psychopath from the equation is to say that the psychopath is not a human being. Since psychopaths are indeed human beings, then what is moral must be disregarded from the equation on that ground as well.

            The true self is also said to be stable, a solid foundation for a person’s character. Yet the problem with this is that there is a lack of empirical evidence to suggest that a person’s character has any stability. Indeed, studies over the last century record evidence quite contrary to this idea. There is a laundry list of factors, even insubstantial ones, that have shown to have a profound effect on human behavior: personal mood, haste, cultural inclinations, perspective, the presence or absence of peers or superiors, etc. Humans are capable of great atrocity, or surprising kindness, even with a shift of small variables. Yet in regards to the equation at hand, it does not even matter what those factors are. What does matter is the sheer fact that one realizes the lack of evidence for stability.

If there is little to no evidence for stability in a person’s character, then it is likely – although not assuredly – that stability does not exist. Because this is an argument attempting to prove the existence of the true self, one must veer away from blind faith in the stability of character and instead take it for what it most likely is: an arbitrary linguistic attribution. No matter the authority assigning them, one cannot put stock in arbitrary attributions, without an appropriate level of evidence, and then accept them as evidence for something else. Quite ironically, “stable” as a quality of the true self is not stable enough to depend on. If one cannot depend on it, then it has no force and cannot be used for anything.

Indeed, even without the empirical evidence hinting at the contrary, one can still see this lack of stability in normal human life. Rather, it is self-evident that the events a person experiences, whether singular and drastic, or frequent and minimal, can cause a lasting effect on that person. In the former case, it is obvious how traumatic events can cause harm, sometimes irreparably, to a person’s behavior. For example, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is, unfortunately, a common and highly visible issue, especially in wartime and in victims of violent crime. This, however, is an extreme case, and something as simple as bullying or the death of a family member can also cause behavioral shifts in an individual.

In the latter case, it can be summed up in a single word: habituation. By doing something over and over again, a person can make that thing a habit, eventually reaching a point where repeating said activity can be done without even needing to be fully conscious of it. Yet a habit, though long lasting and hard to break, can also be unmade, through an opposing process of not doing that thing which contributed to the formation of the habit in the first place, and possibly through forming another habit instead. The person who has a habit of biting their nails has several ways in which said habit can be broken, and thus become a reformed nail biter.

Indeed, rather than displaying the stability of character that is expected of the true self, it is much clearer to see how human beings display the adaptability of character. This goes hand in hand with the earlier argument against the true self’s moral qualities. If people did not possess this ability to adapt, to learn and grow from their experiences, then there would also be no concept of moral growth, and trying to teach children anything of morality would just be a waste of time. Children do need to be taught, however, as any rational parent would say. Does this mean that children do not have a true self? Children are human beings, and if we take human beings as having a true self, then that can only be true if children are not considered human beings.

That, then, is the central issue. If one takes human beings to have a true self, and that the true self is moral, stable and unchanging, then one must either exclude some people, like psychopaths and children, from being considered “human beings,” or drop the defining attributes of “moral, stable and unchanging” from its description. Yet historically, if one excludes the title of “human being” from such people, then those who are still considered human beings may use that as a justification for treating them inhumanely, as has been done in the past. If one takes away those key attributes, then there is little else to define a true self by, and without a proper definition, the “true self” becomes a meaningless concept that would be better to disavow then accept on faith.